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TEACHING VIRTUE: CHANGING ATTITUDES 
Alessandra TANESINI 
 
ABSTRACT: In this paper I offer an original account of intellectual modesty and some of 
its surrounding vices: intellectual haughtiness, arrogance, servility and self-abasement. I 
argue that these vices are attitudes as social psychologists understand the notion. I also 
draw some of the educational implications of the account. In particular, I urge caution 
about the efficacy of direct instruction about virtue and of stimulating emulation 
through exposure to positive exemplars. 
KEYWORDS: virtue epistemology, vice epistemology, intellectual arrogance, 
education, attitude, self-affirmation 
 
Philosophers and educationalists alike often claim that formal education and 
exposure to exemplars are effective strategies for educating students to acquire 
some intellectually virtuous traits such as open-mindedness, curiosity and 
intellectual humility.1 This paper voices a note of caution about the efficacy of this 
approach.2 I base my reservation on the view, which I also defend in this paper, 
that intellectual modesty and the vices that oppose it are strong attitudes toward 
one’s cognitive make-up as a whole and its components.3 My pedagogical 
recommendations are not wholly negative. I conclude the paper with a suggestion 
that self-affirmation techniques help to predispose students to become more 
receptive to teachers’ efforts to promote virtue in the classroom. 
The paper has two main aims. The first is to offer an original account of 
modesty and some of its surrounding vices. The second is to draw some of the 
educational implications of the account. The paper consists of six sections. In the 
                                                                
1 See e.g., Jason Baehr, "Educating for Intellectual Virtues: From Theory to Practice," Journal of 
Philosophy of Education 47, 2 (2013): 248-262; Heather Battaly, "Responsibilist Virtues in 
Reliabilist Classrooms," In Intellectual Virtues and Education: Essays in Applied Virtue 
Epistemology, ed. Jason S. Baehr (New York and London: Routledge, 2016), 163-183; Ron 
Ritchhart, Intellectual Character: What It Is, Why It Matters, and How to Get It (San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass, 2002). 
2 Both Baehr, "Educating for Intellectual Virtues” and Battaly,"Responsibilist Virtues” suggest 
that practice of virtuous actions is also important. I shall not address the issue of habituation 
here. 
3 This paper is only concerned with the intellectual versions of these virtues and vices. 
However, for brevity sake, I often drop the qualifier ‘intellectual’ when talking about these 
character traits. 
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first I argue that intellectual modesty is one component of intellectual humility 
and that modesty does not require underestimation of one’s epistemic abilities nor 
indifference toward one’s intellectual successes. In the section two I explain the 
notion of an attitude as social psychologists understand this construct. In the third 
section I defend the view that modesty is a strong attitude directed at one’s 
epistemic successes which serves knowledge and value-expressive functions. In 
the fourth and fifth sections I argue that the vices that oppose modesty are 
arrogance and self-abasement. I explain what attitudes these are and contrast them 
with their interpersonal varieties: haughtiness (superbia) and servility or 
obsequiousness. In the final section I consider some pedagogical implications 
based on the literature on attitude formation and on attitude change. 
1. Intellectual Modesty 
Modesty about one’s successes and achievements is an essential component of 
intellectual humility. The two notions are so close that Julia Driver’s account of 
modesty has generally been taken as providing a theory of humility.4 However, 
modesty about one’s good qualities is only one aspect of humility since the ability 
to accept or own one’s limitations is equally important if a person is to be truly 
humble.5 Although in my view humility comprises both modesty about successes 
and self-acceptance of limitations, this paper is exclusively concerned with 
providing an account of the relationships between modesty and some of the vices 
that oppose it.6 
Following Driver modesty is often characterised as a virtue of ignorance or 
underestimation.7 In Driver’s view the modest person is either ignorant of her 
good features or underestimates their significance. There is, as others have pointed 
out,8 something fishy about thinking of ignorance as a pre-requisite of virtue; the 
                                                                
4 See Julia Driver, "The Virtues of Ignorance," The Journal of Philosophy 86, 7 (1989): 373-384. 
5 Several accounts of humility have focused exclusively on the limitation owning or knowing 
aspect of the virtue. See for instance, Nancy E. Snow, "Humility," The Journal of Value Inquiry 
29, 2 (1995): 203-216 and Dennis Whitcomb, Heather Battaly, Jason Baehr, and Daniel Howard-
Snyder, "Intellectual Humility: Owning Our Limitations," Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, doi: 10.1111/phpr.12228 (2015): 1-31. 
6 I have presented my account of intellectual humility in Alessandra Tanesini,  “Intellectual 
Humility as Attitude,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, DOI: 10.1111/phpr.12326 
(2016):1-22. 
7 Driver, "The Virtues of Ignorance;" Julia Driver, "Modesty and Ignorance," Ethics 109, 4 
(1999): 827-834; Julia Driver, Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
8 See J. L. A. Garcia, "Being Unimpressed with Ourselves: Reconceiving Humility," Philosophia 
34, 4 (2006): 417-435 at n 6, p. 419. 
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view is especially counter-intuitive when applied to intellectual virtue since the 
failure to have true beliefs about one’s qualities could not possibly be a defining 
feature of any intellectual excellence.9 In addition one can offer counter-examples 
that show that ignorance or underestimation is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
intellectual modesty. An individual who is fully aware of her successes may 
nevertheless be genuinely modest about them by refraining from boasting, 
acknowledging the contributions others made to help her succeed, and avoiding 
seeking the limelight. Thus, ignorance or underestimation is not necessary.10 It is 
also not sufficient since a person may underestimate the real importance of his 
achievements, which becomes clear only with hindsight, and yet be arrogant in 
the way he treats his co-workers.11 
More plausibly modesty concerns one’s stance toward one’s good qualities, 
rather than the failure to possess an accurate estimation of them. The individual 
who is modest cares about her good features, since the person who is indifferent to 
them will lack the motivation to improve or at least maintain her current 
strengths and achievements. However, the modest individual cares about her good 
qualities in a way which is incompatible with self-aggrandizement. This thought 
guides those accounts of modesty that take it to be a matter of adopting a stance 
toward oneself and one’s good qualities of being unimpressed by them, of avoiding 
dwelling or delighting in them.12 Despite some plausibility these accounts are 
ultimately incorrect since modesty cannot consist in the absence of a hot 
motivational or emotional state about one’s good qualities.13 At least in so far as 
modesty is compatible with proper pride about one’s own achievements, it seems 
possible that a person is modest and yet feels elation and pride because of a success 
which is the outcome of much work and sacrifice. The same person may even gain 
in self-confidence because of this success and she may develop a habit of 
                                                                
9 Driver is, of course, aware of the fact. In her view what makes modesty interesting is precisely 
its incompatibility with self-knowledge. 
10 For this kind of counterexample see Owen Flanagan, “Virtue and Ignorance,” Journal of 
Philosophy 87 (1990): 420–428; G.F. Schueler, “Why Modesty is a Virtue,” Ethics 107 (1997): 
467-485; Garcia, "Being Unimpressed” and Alan T. Wilson, "Modesty as Kindness," Ratio 29, 1 
(2016): 73-88. 
11 This point is also noted by Garcia, "Being Unimpressed” and by Wilson, "Modesty as 
Kindness." 
12 Examples of accounts of this sort are: Garcia, "Being Unimpressed” and Nicolas Bommarito, 
“Modesty as a Virtue of Attention,” The Philosophical Review 122, 1 (2013): 93-117. 
13 Hot cognitive states are states that essentially involve arousal. For an account see Paul 
Thagard, in collaboration with, Fred Kroon, Josef Nerb, Baljinder Sahdra, Cameron Shelley, and 
Brandon Wagar, Hot Thought: Mechanisms and Applications of Emotional Cognition 
(Cambridge and London: MIT, 2006). 
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reminding herself of it so as to stave off self-doubt.14 Modesty thus is not 
incompatible even with dwelling on one’s own successes and reminding oneself of 
their impressiveness. 
I have argued so far that accounts of modesty as absence of true beliefs 
about one’s good qualities or absence of positive emotional states directed at the 
same features fail. They fail because they both explain modesty as a disposition to 
ignore one’s good qualities. In Driver’s account one ignores these features because 
one does not know about them, in Garcia’s one is aware of their existence but 
directs the focus of one’s concern elsewhere. In my view modesty is not 
characterised by the absence of a belief or of a hot psychological state such as an 
emotion or a desire but by the presence of a certain kind of care or concern for 
one’s good features. Modesty is in this sense self-centred.15  
In order to see that modesty is best thought as a way of being concerned 
rather than a manner of being unconcerned, imagine a person who does not care 
whether or not she has good qualities. This person has no desire to improve. She 
does not think of herself as either smart or stupid.16 She does not dwell or delight 
in her good qualities and does not wish to draw attention to them. She may even 
not be aware of any qualities she may have. In sum, she simply does not care. 
Undoubtedly such a person would exemplify several defects and vices. It is also 
true that we would not think of her of immodest. Similarly, however, we would 
not think that she is modest either. Indifference to one’s good qualities or 
epistemic success is not what makes one modest about them; what modesty 
requires is that one is concerned about these features of the self. The difference 
between modesty and immodesty lies with the character of that concern. 
                                                                
14 The person who needs to boost her confidence in this manner may be modest but is likely to 
suffer from intellectual timidity. Such an individual has a negative estimate of her abilities and 
thus tends to keep quiet so as to go unnoticed. Reminding oneself that one has good qualities 
helps the timid to find the courage of her convictions. 
15 I thus disagree with Wilson "Modesty as Kindness" who thinks that modesty is driven by a 
concern with the well-being of others. At least with regard to intellectual modesty his account 
is incorrect. It is plausible that a person who is not concerned with other people or their feelings 
may nonetheless be modest about her epistemic successes. One can imagine a very nerdy 
software engineer who is fully focused on producing a new kind of coding. She relishes the 
challenge and the technology is all she cares about. She is rather indifferent to other human 
beings. Yet for all I have said when thinking about her achievements she may be modest in her 
assessment. 
16 I do not mean these remarks to imply that the person who is modest must display a high 
degree of self-reflective awareness. It is possible to think of oneself as smart and manifest this 
conviction in one’s behaviour without having formed conscious judgements about one’s 
intellectual prowess. 
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The individual who is not modest because he is arrogant is concerned with 
his good features and epistemic successes because of how they reflect on his sense 
of self-esteem. Whilst self-confidence is not the same thing as arrogance, the 
arrogant always display self-confidence in the manner of a defence shield.17 The 
arrogant person uses his own positive estimation of his own abilities and successes 
as a way of protecting and boosting his self-esteem. If this is right, given that 
modesty is incompatible with arrogance, it seems plausible to think of modesty as 
exhibiting a different kind of self-confidence. The person who is modest also has a 
positive attitude toward at least some of her qualities and features which she views 
as successes. However, her positive stance which grounds her self-confidence does 
not serve the need to defend the ego. Instead, the person who is intellectually 
modest cares for her successes because of their epistemic worth and because they 
are a manifestation of the values to which she subscribes. Hence, a modest 
scientist may display confidence in her own abilities because she has a positive 
evaluation of these. However, her stance toward her own successes is a concern 
that they promote the acquisition of epistemic goods and express support for 
epistemic values such as truth and knowledge. 
Before offering a defence of this account of modesty as a positive stance 
toward one’s own good features which is a way of caring for them for their worth 
rather than because of their ability to protect one’s self-esteem, I need to take a 
detour in section two to explain the social psychological notion of an attitude. I 
return to modesty in section three in order to supply the details of my account and 
to begin its defence. 
2. Attitudes 
The notion of an attitude is the core construct of social psychology. It was 
introduced by Allport and has been adopted ever since.18 There are different 
definitions and accounts of attitudes in the psychological literature. Nevertheless, 
there is a consensus that attitudes are summary evaluations directed at an object.19 
                                                                
17 In this the arrogant and the haughty are not alone. Timid individuals also use self-confidence 
as a defence mechanism. 
18 See G. W. Allport, “Attitudes,” In Handbook of social psychology, ed. C. Murchison 
(Worcester: Clark University Press, 1935), 798–844. 
19 See Mahzarin R. Banaji, and Larisa Heiphetz, "Attitudes," In Handbook of Social Psychology, 
eds. Susan T. Fiske, Daniel T. Gilbert and Gardner Lindzey (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 
2010), 353-93 and Russell H. Fazio and Michael A. Olson, “Attitudes: Foundations, Functions 
and Consequences,” In The Sage Handbook of Social Psychology, eds. Michael A. Hogg and Joel 
Cooper (London: SAGE, 2007), 141. Anything whatsoever at any level of generality can be the 
object of an attitude since these include items such as my umbrella or ideals such as freedom. 
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More specifically, they are associations of a valence (positive or negative) with an 
object. One can think of attitudes as preferences and dislikes. They can cause the 
agent to interact with, or approach, the object when one likes it, or to avoid an 
object that is disliked. They also comprise positive or negative emotions directed 
at the target object. Attitudes so conceived should therefore not be confused with 
propositional attitudes since the latter concern psychological relations to 
propositions. Attitudes as social psychology understands them do not have 
propositional contents. 
Attitudes are learnt. They are formed on the basis of experience, past 
behaviour, other attitudes, background beliefs, needs, desires and emotions. One 
may think of the attitude itself as a cognitive shortcut. Over time individuals 
evaluate objects for their good and bad features; they carry out these evaluations 
based on the information supplied by their relevant beliefs, desires and emotions 
and by their past encounters with the objects. Individuals will tend to form an 
overall or summary view of an object weighing up all of these considerations, 
which results in the object being positively regarded (liked) or negatively 
considered (disliked).20 It makes sense to hypothesise that individuals do not re-
assess objects anew every time that they encounter them, as this processing would 
involve significant cognitive loads. Instead, individuals may store in memory the 
final outcome of their evaluations, ready to be retrieved and direct behaviour 
when one is confronted with the target. These stored representations are the 
attitudes.21 
The psychological states which represent the information on which the 
attitude is based are said to be the content or basis of the attitude. According to 
the classic account of attitudes these contents always include evaluative beliefs, 
affective states, and dispositions to behave. But the attitude is not just determined 
by the information represented in its content, an important role in the formation, 
preservation and modification of attitudes is played by their functions. Attitudes 
record the evaluations of objects; but how objects are evaluated depends on the 
needs served by the evaluations as well as the information possessed about the 
object. For example, one evaluates objects for their contribution to one’s survival. 
                                                                
20 It is also possible that a person may end being ambivalent about an object because they feel 
both positively and negatively about it for different reasons. I shall not discuss ambivalent 
attitudes here. They have been shown not to be cross- situationally stable, see Gregory R. Maio 
and Geoffrey Haddock, The Psychology of Attitudes and Attitude Change (Los Angeles: SAGE, 
2009), 34. 
21 There is some disagreement as to whether attitudes are stored or made on the hoof every time 
one encounters the object. See, Banaji and Heiphetz, "Attitudes." Either way the attitudes are 
the outcome of evaluations which they summarise. 
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hence, one forms positive attitudes toward items which are edible, and negative 
ones toward those which are inedible. One will, as a result, avoid those items that 
one dislikes and eat those one likes. 
There is some agreement on several of the functions that attitudes may 
serve. Among these the best established are: knowledge, utilitarian, object-
appraisal, ego-defensive, social-adjustive, and value-expressive.22 Attitudes that 
serve the knowledge function are acquired and sustained to satisfy the need for 
knowledge and understanding.23 Attitudes that have the function of assessing 
objects for their preference-satisfying qualities have a utilitarian function.  Those 
with ego-defensive function serve the need to defend the individual against 
threats while the social-adjustive function serves the need to fit in with one’s 
affinity group. Attitudes which are value-expressive have the function of 
expressing a person’s values.24 Finally, the object-appraisal function is often 
singled out as playing a special role. It is sometimes thought as the sum of the 
utilitarian and knowledge functions. It is also said to be a function served by all 
attitudes irrespective of their other functions.25 
The causal effectiveness of attitudes (and their informational contents) is 
largely dependent on their strength. The term ‘attitude strength’ is used to refer to 
different features of attitudes, but it is most commonly read as a measure of the 
strength of the associative connection between the object and the positive or 
                                                                
22 See, Russell H. Fazio, "Accessible Attitudes as Tools for Object Appraisal: Their Costs and 
Benefits," In Why We Evaluate: Functions of Attitudes, eds. Gregory R. Maio and James M. 
Olson (Mahwah and London: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000), 1-36; Gregory R. Maio, Victoria M. 
Esses, Karin H. Arnold, and James M. Olson, "The Function-Structure Model of Attitudes: 
Incorporating the Need for Affect," In Contemporary Perspectives on the Psychology of 
Attitudes, eds. Geoffrey Haddock and Gregory R. Maio (Hove: Psychology, 2004), 9-33. 
23 See, Daniel Katz, "The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes," Public Opinion 
Quarterly 24, 2 (1960): 163-204. 
24 Maio et al., “The Function-Structure Model.” One may have an attitude serving this function 
toward an object which is not itself a value but which symbolises, or is in other ways associated 
with, values or deeply significant features of the self. Hence, a supporter’s attitude toward her 
football team is likely to be value-expressive. Conversely, one may have ego-defensive or social-
adjustive attitudes toward values when one is positive about them because feeling that way 
makes one feel good about oneself or helps one to fit in with one’s crowd. 
25 Fazio, "Accessible Attitudes.” In my opinion the psychological literature on this issue often 
displays confusions since it risks a vacuous identification of object-appraisal with the evaluation 
that serves the function of evaluating. In addition, there is a tendency to presume that one may 
seek to acquire knowledge only as a means to utilitarian ends. In order to avoid these pitfalls, I 
treat the knowledge and utilitarian functions as distinct, and interpret talk of object-appraisal 
function as being ambiguously about either or both of these functions. 
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negative valence that make-up the attitude.26 Thus, the strength of the attitude 
does not mark how much one likes or dislikes the object. Instead it measures the 
strength of the association between the object and the positive or negative 
valence. For example, a moderate preference for ice-cream could be a strong 
attitude if mere exposure to ice-cream always activates the attitude and thus 
triggers a positive (although not intense) feeling. An intense dislike for spinach 
could be a weak attitude if the extreme reaction to it is only occasionally present 
when one encounters, or thinks about, this vegetable. Strong attitudes are highly 
accessible or easily activated because they are attitudes in which the valence is 
strongly associated with the object so that when one is present, the other is 
triggered.27 
In section three I argue that virtues and vices are clusters of strong attitudes 
together with their informational bases serving given functions. For now, I wish 
to alert the reader to some features of strong attitudes that make them suitable as 
candidates for the states that would show virtues and vices to have psychological 
reality. Virtues and vices are often said to be effective in guiding behaviour; to be 
capable of directing visual attention; perhaps to have characteristic motivations; to 
be closely related to characteristic emotions; to express deep features of the 
person’s character, and to be stable across situations. Strong attitudes possess all of 
these features. They guide behaviour; they direct visual attention;28 they have 
affective, cognitive and behavioural bases;29 they can be expressive of the values 
with which an agent identifies30 and they are cross-situationally stable.31 These are 
empirically robust results. They have been obtained independently of any thought 
about virtues and vices, since in the social psychological literature no connections 
are drawn between attitudes and the philosophical notions of virtues or vices. 
 
                                                                
26 Greg Maio and Geoffrey Haddock, "Attitude Change," In Social Psychology: Handbook of 
Basic Principles, eds. Arie W. Kruglanski and E. Tory Higgins (New York: Guilford Press, 2007), 
565-586. 
27 Fazio, "Accessible Attitudes.” 
28 Ibid. 
29 Fazio and Olson, “Attitudes.” 
30 Gregory R. Maio and James M. Olson, “Emergent Themes and Potential Approaches to 
Attitude Function: The Function-Structure Model of Attitudes,” In Why We Evaluate: 
Functions of Attitudes, eds. Gregory R. Maio and James M. Olson (Mahwah and London: 
Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000), 417-442. 
31 Fazio, "Accessible Attitudes.” 
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3. Modest Attitudes 
Modesty is best understood as a cluster of strong positive attitudes, together with 
their informational bases, directed toward features of one’s own cognitive make-
up which serve knowledge and value expressive functions. The aims of this section 
are: first, to flesh out and explain this claim; second, to argue for its plausibility. 
I use the notion of cognitive make-up broadly to include an agent’s 
cognitive habits, skills, abilities, and their products such as beliefs, theories and 
perceptions as well as the agent’s character traits.32 Hence, capacities such as 
memory, traits like open-mindedness, and psychological states such as a belief that 
whales are mammals are all components of the agent’s cognitive make-up. Most 
adult human beings have a “feel” for their intellectual strengths and weaknesses. 
They do not necessarily have explicitly formulated opinions, based on well-
developed reasons, about which features of their cognitive make-up count as their 
strengths or weaknesses. Instead these are evaluations to which they may have 
arrived unthinkingly and which they may adopt unreflectingly. None the less, 
individuals’ problem-solving strategies, levels of self-confidence, and general 
approach to daily life are in part guided by their summary evaluation of their 
intellectual abilities, of their character, and of their views. It is, therefore, 
extremely likely that most adults have attitudes towards their own cognitive 
make-up as a whole and many of its components. These attitudes may serve 
several functions. 
Consider a person who treats doing maths as one of her intellectual 
strengths. This person may consciously believe that she is good at math, but she 
may also simply behave like someone confident in her mathematical abilities 
without having ever reflected on her skill. Nevertheless, if she were asked to think 
about it, she may say that mathematics is indeed one of her strengths. In sum, this 
person has a positive attitude toward her facility with numbers. She will have 
acquired this attitude over time on the basis of her past experiences and her 
background beliefs. This attitude serves a knowledge function if it has been 
formed, and is maintained, to serve the need for knowledge and understanding. 
The person who has a positive attitude toward her mathematical ability 
likes this aspect of her cognitive make-up. If the attitude serves a knowledge 
function, this person has acquired this preference because in the past her reliance 
                                                                
32 One may wish to include books, papers, machinery and artefacts among the products of an 
agent’s cognitive abilities. I shall bracket here the question as to whether these are to be 
included in an agent’s cognitive make-up. I am, however, inclined to believe that attitudes 
toward these objects would figure as components of modesty. Thanks to the editors of this issue 
for raising this point. 
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on her mathematical skills has promoted her acquisition of knowledge and 
understanding. She has thus learnt that using her numerical abilities is a good 
strategy for her when she wants to acquire epistemic goods. As a result, this 
person likes this aspect of herself but she does so as a result of its role in 
facilitating her acquisition of knowledge and understanding. In a word, their 
promotion of epistemic goods is what causes this person to care for her numerical 
skills. 
If the attitude also serves a value-expressive function, the individual likes 
this aspect of her cognitive make-up because expressing a preference for it is a way 
of endorsing her values.33 In this instance, the values in question must be 
epistemic values since this person likes those aspects of herself which, serving a 
knowledge function, promote those values. Hence, this individual’s positive 
attitude toward her mathematical ability is an expression of her valuing of truth 
and knowledge. If this attitude is strong, it is easily accessible and thus effective to 
guide behaviour and attention in numerous contexts. 
It is my contention that the person who is intellectually modest possesses 
strong attitudes toward those aspects of her cognitive make-up which she regards 
as positive that play exclusively knowledge and value-expressive functions. This is 
a person who has over time formed evaluations of her cognitive make-up; she has 
formed these evaluations on the basis of her past experience of which of her traits 
and features have served her well. Since her past reliance on aspects of her 
cognitive make-up was driven by the need for knowledge and understanding, she 
has, as a result, developed a preference for those traits that seemed to assist the 
achievement of these goals. In addition, she takes these preferences to express her 
values, which must be epistemic values since it is those traits that promote these 
values that she takes to express her commitments. 
I have argued in the first section of this paper that modesty is a concern 
with one’s own good intellectual features. This concern is manifested as a positive 
stance toward one’s intellectual qualities rather than an attitude of indifference or 
a lack of knowledge about what they are. However, this positive evaluation must 
not be motivated by the desire for self-esteem or the need to fit in with one’s 
affinity group. The person who possesses these attitudes may make mistakes and 
underestimate or overestimate the actual value of some of her intellectual traits. 
However, these will be honest mistakes since her attitudes are based on her past 
experience of pursuing knowledge and understanding. In addition, this person is 
                                                                
33 This notion of expression bears not connection to expressivism as a position in meta-ethics. In 
this context the expression of a value is any activity that allows one to re-enforce or make 
manifest a value one endorses. 
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not prone to self-aggrandizement since she cares for her qualities because they are 
good and not because they make her feel good about herself or accepted by her 
peers. Further, the person whose attitudes serve the knowledge function must be 
focused on improvement since she will tend to dislike those of her traits that 
prevent her from satisfying this need. As a result, she possesses a motivation to 
change them, rather than to ignore her limitations. 
I have given so far several reasons to believe that intellectual modesty is a 
positive stance toward some aspects of one’s cognitive make-up but not others. 
These patterns of evaluations are partly based on information acquired by past 
experiences of relying on components of one’s cognitive make-up to satisfy the 
need for knowledge and understanding. These evaluations are not beliefs about 
the epistemic qualities of these components, although they may be based on such 
beliefs. The evaluations themselves are attitudes which consist in associations of 
the object evaluated with a negative or positive affective state. It is these attitudes 
and their informational bases that explain the behaviours that are characteristic of 
modesty such as being a willing team player, not boasting or bragging, being 
sensible about which risks are worth taking, showing a concern for the correctness 
of one’s views over caring that one’s discoveries show one to be intellectually 
talented. 
One of the clearest arguments, however, in favour of identifying modesty 
with this cluster of attitudes is based on the relation of modesty to its surrounding 
vices. The framework of attitudes sheds new light on the nature of vices such as 
arrogance, haughtiness, self-abasement and servility and their relation to the 
virtues to which they are opposed. In what follows I provide an account of these 
four vices and of their relations. This account supplies further evidence in support 
of the view of modesty I have articulated in this section. 
4. Arrogance and Haughtiness (Superbia) 
Arrogance is a cluster of strong attitudes directed toward features of one’s 
cognitive agency which serve an ego-defensive function (and, possibly, other 
functions as well). Haughtiness (superbia) is the interpersonal version of arrogance 
consisting of attitudes toward aspects of one’s cognitive make-up, serving the same 
ego-defensive function, which are informed by evaluative beliefs consisting in 
judgements comparing one’s abilities to those possessed by selected others. 
Arrogant behaviour is both widespread and heterogeneous. We think of the 
bankers who lost other people’s savings as arrogant, and we would think that a 
person, who thinks of himself as invulnerable, and thus takes excessive risks with 
his and others’ lives as being equally arrogant as well as irresponsible. Intellectual 
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arrogance often takes the form of a sort of hyper-autonomy. It is characterised by 
a sense that one has no intellectual debts to anybody else so that one’s 
achievements are wholly creditable to oneself. It is also manifested in an excessive 
form of epistemic self-reliance understood as an unwillingness to take any other 
epistemic agent to be trustworthy. The wholly arrogant individual gives no 
evidential weight to the beliefs held by others, whilst putting a lot of trust in his 
own views. 34 
Arrogance can also be manifested in conversation by those who think they 
have all the answers, who are ‘full of themselves’, who boast about their abilities, 
who respond angrily to proper criticism, who are condescending and often use 
‘put-downs’, who speak over other people without respecting their conversational 
turn. In addition, there are arrogant bodily postures or habits which include so 
called ‘manspreading’ in shared public spaces. Some of these behaviours exemplify 
arrogance proper, understood as epistemic hyper-autonomy, whilst others exhibit 
the sense of superiority and disdain for others which is characteristic of a vice that 
I label ‘haughtiness’ although the term may not be fully adequate to the concept I 
wish to describe.35 What I have in mind is what Dante refers to as superbia in his 
Comedy where he describes this trait as a desire to see others’ worth diminished so 
that one can excel.36’37 
The person who wishes to do others down so that he can feel superior is 
trying to claim for himself some kind of epistemic achievement or entitlement 
while attempting to deny it to others. For example, such a person may talk up 
their contribution to a collective success and he may also intimate that the 
contributions made by others are not as significant as one may have previously 
thought. He may even dismiss the views put forward by others. For this reason, 
                                                                
34 Tiberius and Walker note that arrogance is an obstacle to acquiring information from other 
people. See, Valerie Tiberius and John D. C. Walker, "Arrogance," American Philosophical 
Quarterly 35, 4 (1998): 382. On the idea of excessive epistemic self-reliance see Linda Trinkaus 
Zagzebski, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief (Oxford 
and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), especially ch. 3. 
35 See also, Alessandra Tanesini, “I - 'Calm Down, Dear': Intellectual Arrogance, Silencing and 
Ignorance,” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90, 1 (2016): 71-92. 
36 Purg., XVII vv 91-100 and 115-17. Dante Alighieri, La Commedia Secondo L'antica Vulgata, 
ed. by Giorgio Petrocchi. 2a ristampa riv. ed. (Firenze: Casa editrice Le lettere, 1994). 
37 ‘Superbia’ is generally translated into English as ‘pride’. However, this translation is in my 
view misleading since pride as is commonly understood in the contemporary English speaking 
world is closer to what the medieval thought of as self-love. Self-love finds expression in the 
desire to excel and to improve. It is not generally thought to be vicious. Superbia is a distortion 
of self-love which is in part characterised by behaviours aimed at thwarting other people’s 
aspirations to excel. 
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haughtiness is best thought as a vice opposed to proper pride. The latter concerns 
claiming authority and entitlements that are commensurate to one’s intellectual 
successes and achievements; whilst the former is an attempt to secure some kind 
of special status for oneself. 
I have argued above that modesty is neither a matter of being ignorant of 
one’s good features nor of underestimating their extent. In a similar vein, 
overestimating one’s qualities is neither necessary nor sufficient for arrogance or 
haughtiness. It is not sufficient because a person may overestimate the import of 
her good features due to an honest mistake. It is also not necessary because it is in 
principle possible for a person, who is in fact very talented, to have the measure of 
his talents but be arrogant about them. 
Earlier I also showed that modesty is compatible with proper pride in one’s 
achievements. It follows that being happy about one’s good features is not 
necessarily a manifestation of arrogance. Consider a scientist who, after years of 
toil, makes a significant discovery and responds to the hard-won result with 
delight and even a sense of pride. This scientist may be either modest or haughty 
and arrogant. She is modest if she feels relief that the discovery has now been 
made; and her delight is directed toward the significance of the result. However, 
she is haughty or arrogant if she feels relief that it was her who made the 
discovery (rather than say another scientist); and her delight is directed toward 
the fact that this great achievement is hers.38 In short, the modest scientist cares 
that a significant discovery was made; what matters most to the arrogant one is 
that it was made by her.39 So individuals who are arrogant or haughty value their 
good qualities, not primarily because of their worth, but because of how they 
reflect on their self-esteem. It is for this reason that arrogance, but also 
haughtiness, is associated with an inflated sense of self-worth.  
What these examples show is that neither arrogance nor haughtiness are 
best explained by the presence of some beliefs about one’s intellectual abilities. 
They are also not to be characterised in terms of the emotional state of being 
delighted about these. Both belief and emotion are compatible with modesty and 
thus cannot be sufficient for arrogance. The difference between arrogance, 
                                                                
38 The arrogant person need not be aware that she possesses this psychological structure. See 
Tanesini, “‘Calm Down, Dear.'” 
39 Hence, arrogance is often accompanied by stinginess or lack of intellectual generosity. The 
arrogant frequently fails to give others the credit that they are due and, when haughty, may also 
seek to deprive others of important information so as to put obstacles in the way of their 
epistemic achievements. See Robert Campbell Roberts and W. Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues: 
An Essay in Regulative Epistemology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 293-298. 
Thanks to J. Adam Carter for highlighting this connection. 
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haughtiness and modesty lies with the needs satisfied by the positive stance one 
takes toward some aspects of one’s cognitive agency or make-up. 
Arrogance as haughtiness is also often accompanied by a sense of one’s own 
intellectual superiority. The person who cares for her achievements because of 
how they reflect on the self is also likely to think of herself as intellectually 
superior to others and consequently deserving of special treatment. Nevertheless, 
thinking this way is not sufficient for arrogance, nor- arguably- is it necessary. It is 
not sufficient because it is perfectly possible for someone who is actually 
intellectually superior to those around him to be aware of this fact without being 
immodest. For instance, a brilliant doctor who is also accomplished in other areas 
may rightly believe that her knowledge, skills and abilities are better than those 
around her. This belief will influence her actions but need not lead to treating 
others in disrespectful ways or to dismiss their contributions.40 Equally it seems 
possible to be innocently mistaken about one’s own intellectual superiority 
without thereby being immodest. A person, who believes that she is superior to 
her colleagues because she justifiably thinks that she has made a momentous 
discovery, is not rendered arrogant if it turns out with hindsight that she had 
overestimated the lasting significance of her work. So a belief in one’s intellectual 
superiority even when that belief is actually false is not sufficient for arrogance. 
This claim may sound odd, but its oddity can be attributed to a shared 
background belief common in liberal societies that no individual is actually 
superior to all others in all intellectual respects. Consequently, it would seem 
plausible to infer that if one thinks of himself as superior in this way, this sense of 
superiority must be motivated by arrogance or haughtiness rather than by taking 
stock of one’s abilities and track record. Thus, for instance, it seems perfectly 
possible that without arrogance a person may judge herself as the most suited for 
carrying out a difficult task compared to other members of the team. What seems 
implausible is that somebody would think in this way about every task without 
being arrogant. 
The belief that one is intellectually superior to everybody else is also 
plausibly not necessary for haughtiness or arrogance. It is possible for an 
individual to sustain a supreme confidence in his own abilities and to take such 
delight in them because of how they inflate his own sense of self-esteem by being 
selective in one’s comparative assessments of one’s intellectual successes. This 
individual can display haughtiness without consciously thinking of himself as 
superior to all others. As a matter of fact, such person may positively avoid 
                                                                
40 Roberts and Wood Intellectual Virtues make the same point at p. 243 using the historical 
example of Alfred Schweitzer. 
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considering ways in which he may be dissimilar from very accomplished 
individuals in the fear that he may as a result be diminished in his own eyes. 
Instead, he may, without being fully aware of the fact, choose to consider only the 
ways in which he differs from individuals who are clearly less accomplished than 
he is in the domain under evaluation. In this manner, a haughty individual may 
sustain a sense of intellectual superiority without fully believing that one is 
intellectually superior to everyone else. Alternatively, the person who has 
acquired arrogance proper, which I have described as a kind of hyper-autonomy, 
may not have any beliefs about other people’s comparative talents and abilities. 
Since he values being completely epistemically independent from all others, he 
has not need to assess their relative abilities in order to understand whom he could 
depend on. 
Roberts and Wood have identified arrogance with an illicit claim to 
entitlements based on one’s alleged intellectual superiority.41 I have just argued 
that thinking of oneself as intellectually superior to others, even when that belief 
is false, is neither sufficient nor necessary for haughtiness or arrogance. 
Nevertheless, Roberts and Wood are onto something here. What they are pointing 
to is not a feature of arrogance per se, but a characteristic of haughtiness which is 
arrogance in interpersonal relations. Haughtiness does not require belief in one’s 
intellectual superiority but it requires that one feels and acts in superior ways, 
which is to say, it requires that one arrogates special epistemic entitlements for 
oneself. 
Arrogance and haughtiness tend to go hand in hand. However, individuals 
may be arrogant without being haughty when they are not concerned with 
establishing their intellectual superiority over others. It is instead difficult to think 
that a haughty individual may be totally free of the hyper-autonomy which is 
characteristic of arrogance. It may therefore be tempting to think of haughtiness 
as arrogance when combined with feelings of superiority and superior behaviour. 
This conclusion, I believe, is mistaken. Arrogance without haughtiness can be a 
worse vice than ordinary haughty arrogance.42 The person who exhibits it 
manifests such excessive confidence in his own abilities that he no longer feels the 
need to compare himself with others. We may perhaps think of this behaviour as 
hubristic. In sum the haughty individual still needs to compare himself positively 
with some others to sustain his arrogant self-conception, the person who is purely 
arrogant no longer feels this need because he somehow thinks of himself as 
                                                                
41 See Roberts and Wood, Intellectual Virtues, 243. 
42 For an argument that arrogance is a worse obstacle to proper engagement in the epistemic 
practice of asserting, see Tanesini “‘Calm Down, Dear.'” 
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radically different from other ordinary agents. This attitude is exemplified in 
literature and myths by the figures of Faust and of Icarus. Both embody the idea of 
an individual who behaves as if he has transcended ordinary human abilities, and 
acquired those of a different kind of being. Thus, Faust is meant to have unlimited 
knowledge, whilst Icarus flies. The truly arrogant individual does not behave as if 
he were better than other people; he behaves as if he were unique, as if he were 
the only agent who is unquestionably and always intellectually trustworthy. 
Thinking of these vices as clusters of strong attitudes directed toward 
components of one’s cognitive agency or make-up helps to understand their 
nature and the relations between them and the virtues they oppose. I have 
described arrogance and haughtiness as a positive stance toward one’s own 
intellectual abilities which is compatible with possessing an accurate assessment of 
them. What separates the arrogant from the modest is that the former but not the 
latter adopts this stance because having it contributes to securing high self-esteem.  
This description can be captured using the framework of attitudes. I have 
argued that the person who is modest has strong positive attitudes toward some 
aspects of her cognitive make-up, which she therefore treats as her epistemic 
strengths or successes, and that these attitudes are formed to serve a knowledge 
function. However, a person may have a similarly positive evaluation of his 
abilities which is formed to serve a different function. 
Imagine someone who has a positive attitude directed at his mathematical 
skills. The attitude is the result of past experiences that have led one to associate 
using one’s mathematical skills to feeling good about oneself. As a result, one has 
acquired a positive evaluation of one’s mathematical skills. Since these are skills to 
solve problems and acquire knowledge and understanding, to treat them as one of 
one’s good features, as this person does, is to take oneself to be skilled at 
mathematics. In other words, this individual treats his mathematical skills as one 
of his intellectual strengths or good features. However, this evaluation serves a 
ego-defensive function. This person likes his mathematical skills not because he is 
good at mathematics, but because these skills make him feel good about himself. 
This person may or may not actually be good at math, what is crucial for 
the acquisition of the attitude, is that past employment of the skill have resulted in 
situations that have enhanced one’s self-concept so that one has learnt to use math 
to protect one’s own self-esteem against threats that may diminish it.43 A person 
                                                                
43 The threats in question need not be threats to one’s self-assessment of one’s mathematical 
abilities in particular. They can be threats to any other aspect of one’s self-estimation. Feeling 
good about one’s ability to do math or any other positive attitude toward an aspect of the self 
can be used to neutralise the threat. See Ian McGregor, Paul R. Nail, Denise C. Marigold, and 
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with average ability may have a history of positive experiences with mathematics 
if others expect him to be good at the subject. These expectations mean that his 
failures will often be explained away. Teachers may say that the problem was too 
hard for kids of his age, or that he was having a bad day. It may also mean that he 
will receive praise and credit when he succeeds. Consequently, even a person who 
is not particularly good at it may nevertheless initially form a positive attitude 
about his mathematical ability serving a knowledge function.  
As this individual grows up, however, he would also find himself in 
situations that offer him with opportunities to calibrate his attitude to his actual 
ability. If this person’s attitude serves the need to feel good about oneself, the 
individual in question may seek to avoid situations that put his abilities in 
question by, for instance, ignoring questions, and commanding or cajoling 
someone else to carry out a given task. But if these situations cannot be avoided, 
he will seek to discount them. He may blame other people’s poor efforts; he may 
choose to carry out some other allegedly more challenging task. He may simply 
forget various failures while choosing to remember and ‘big up’ any success. In 
short this individual will maintain his attitude in the light of evidence of its 
inappropriateness, because the function served by the attitude is not that of 
facilitating the acquisition of knowledge or understanding. Instead, the attitude 
satisfies the need to preserve one’s self-esteem. Provided that opportunities to 
engage with mathematics continue for the large part to help one to feel good 
about oneself, the positive attitude is maintained. Further, because the individual 
in question feels good about his mathematical abilities, he is in effect treating 
these as among his intellectual successes or strengths since it would not be 
rationally consistent to feel good about them unless one were good at 
mathematics. 
Although this attitude serves an ego-defensive function, the individual who 
has it is very unlikely to be fully aware of the true causes of his attitude formation. 
Plausibly, he does not know about this aspect of his psychology, because such 
knowledge would undermine the attitude. One’s positive attitude toward one’s 
own mathematical abilities bolsters one’s confidence. But confidence can only be 
sustained if one is not aware that it is caused by the fact that confidence makes 
one feel good about oneself so that one has an incentive to maintain it. If one were 
                                                                                                                                       
So-Jin Kang, “Defensive Pride and Consensus: Strength in Imaginary Numbers,” Journal of 
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aware that one’s confidence in one’s mathematical prowess is unrelated to one’s 
actual abilities, one would be forced to abandon one’s positive attitude.44 
The arrogant person exemplifies what social psychologists have 
characterised as a defensive high self-esteem. Such individuals have high self-
esteem as this is measured explicitly by means of self-reports, but appear to be low 
in self-esteem according to implicit measures such as those delivered by evaluative 
priming tests. There is now empirical evidence that these people tend to have 
strong attitudes, that their attitudes tend to serve ego-defensive functions45 and 
that they exhibit arrogant behaviour.46 
Social comparison is one of the routes to arrogance. It is well-established 
that human beings often compare their abilities to those possessed by others. 
These social comparisons result in evaluative beliefs in which one represents 
oneself as similar to, or different from, some other person used as a kind of 
standard in the social comparison judgment.47 One of the motives for engaging in 
this process is self-enhancement. Those who possess this motive compare 
themselves to others who are reputed to possess an epistemic strength to test the 
hypothesis that they are similar to these models, and to others who are not 
thought as particularly strong in some ability to test the hypothesis that they are 
dissimilar from them. Given the known cognitive bias in favour of evidence which 
confirms the hypothesis under consideration, rather than evidence that 
disconfirms it, these individual will retrieve information about themselves that 
makes them similar to capable individuals and dissimilar to those who are less 
able. As a result, these individuals succeed in thinking more highly of themselves, 
and in facilitating the future retrieval of favourable information about the self. In 
short the person who engages in social comparison due to a motivation of self-
enhancement thinks that he is different from others whom he judges to be 
inferior, but similar to those who are thought to be extremely talented. 
I have argued above that the arrogant individual is the person who forms 
strong positive attitudes towards one’s own cognitive agency as a whole and a 
                                                                
44 The belief that one’s confidence is unwarranted would become part of the information base of 
the attitude and lead to change toward a more negative attitude and thus undermine self-
confidence. 
45 See Geoffrey Haddock and Jochen E. Gebauer, “Defensive Self-Esteem Impacts Attention, 
Attitude Strength, and Self-Affirmation Processes,” Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 
47, 6 (2011): 1276-1284. 
46 See McGregor et al. “Defensive Pride.” 
47 For an overview see Katja Corcoran, Jan Crusius, and Thomas Mussweiler, “Social 
Comparison: Motives, Standards, and Mechanisms,” In Theories in Social Psychology, ed. Derek 
Chadee (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 119-139. 
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great many of its components. These positive evaluations though serve an ego-
defensive function so that the person has developed a preference for those aspects 
of one’s cognitive make-up that make him feel good about himself and treats those 
as his intellectual strengths. We are now in a position to see that these attitudes 
are not formed exclusively through a process of classic conditioning (where one 
associates two stimuli because they tend to occur together) but they are also 
derived from the attitudes informational contents which include comparative 
judgments about one’s intellectual abilities as well as information about the same. 
These judgements, if they are the outcome of social comparisons motivated by the 
desire for self-enhancement, are biased. But they inform the formation and 
preservation of positive attitudes serving an ego-defensive function. 
I take it, therefore, that an important difference between haughtiness and 
arrogance proper lies in the attitude content or informational basis. The haughty 
individual is the person in whom evaluative comparative beliefs motivated by self-
enhancement are explanatorily important to explicate the processes of attitude 
formation and preservation and to understand the behaviour caused by the 
attitudes. The person who is arrogant without being haughty is person for whom 
social comparison does not play a significant role. 
5. Self-Abasement and Servility 
I have argued that arrogance is a vice that opposes modesty by involving a positive 
evaluation (an approval) of one’s own intellectual character or make-up and of its 
components which does not serve the need to find out their actual epistemic 
worth, but to boost one’s own sense of self-worth. Correspondingly, self-
abasement is a vice that flanks modesty in the opposite direction. It comprises an 
overall negative evaluation (dislike) of one’s own cognitive agency or make-up 
(and some of its components) whose function is not to assess its epistemic 
qualities, but which instead serves the need to fit in with other people. Hence, 
self-abasement is a vice possessed by individuals who are thought by other 
members of the community to lack intellectual strengths or abilities, and who 
adopt that low evaluation for themselves because of the need for social acceptance. 
The self-abasing person is someone who does herself down and who 
belittles her own abilities and achievements. She may be aware of her successes, 
but she is likely not to think of them as achievements (it was just luck) or as her 
own (by giving all the credit to others or underplaying their originality or 
significance). The self-abasing person, like the arrogant, evaluates her own 
successes primarily because of what they show about her cognitive make-up. But, 
whilst the haughty individual’s concern for her successes is explained by their 
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contribution to her sense of self-worth, the evaluation of the self-abasing results 
from a focus on what others will make of her.48 In addition, the self-abasing 
individual may feel shame because of the poverty of her achievements, and engage 
in self-humiliating behaviour by belittling herself and deprecating her own 
stupidity. W.E.B. Du Bois refers to behaviour of this sort when he discusses the 
educational policies for black colleges promoted by Booker T. Washington. He 
notes that self-abasement and obsequiousness are always a risk for those whom, in 
Du Bois’ words, develop a “sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes 
of others.”49 
Du Bois’ observation points to two further features of self-abasement: it 
typically affects members of stigmatised or otherwise subordinated groups; and it 
is linked to intellectual servility. This is no surprise since it is individuals who 
belong to these groups who tend to be widely held in low esteem in society so that 
even absolute strangers will be prone to harbour prejudices about their abilities. It 
is also no surprise that a person who belittles her own abilities is likely to be 
intellectually servile and constantly to defer to the opinions of others whom she 
judges to be her intellectual superiors. 
Once again the framework of attitudes sheds light on these two vices, on 
their mutual relations and their opposition to modesty. Self-abasement is a cluster 
of strong attitudes directed toward one’s cognitive agency and its components 
which are mostly negative and that serve a social-adjustive function. Hence, 
whilst the arrogant comes to associate several aspects of his cognitive make-up 
with positivity because of how they have served him in his defence of the ego 
against threats, the self-abasing associates his cognitive make-up and many of its 
components with a negative valence because they have hindered him in his 
attempts to be part of the in-group. His true abilities and skills have not assisted 
him in the past because other members of the group are willing to accept him only 
in so far as he conforms to their expectations about his low status. In addition, 
those features of his cognitive agency that have served him well are those that 
have helped him to secure membership in society. Thus, he will have formed 
positive attitudes, and see as his intellectual strengths, traits of his intellectual 
character that ingratiate him to individuals who are members of the in-group, 
confirm his low status and promote self-humiliating behaviour. Hence, this person 
                                                                
48 A person may be haughty and also concerned with being held in high esteem by other people. 
When this happens the individual in question is intellectually vain as well as being haughty. A 
full discussion of the relation between these vices is beyond the scope of this paper. 
49 See W. E. B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folk (New York: Vintage Books/Library of America, 
1990). The quotation is from p. 7. 
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behaves as if he has no intellectual strengths and prefers those aspects of his 
cognitive make up that in fact support the overall negative assessment of his 
intellectual abilities. He may, for example, treat his ability to defer to the views of 
others as one of his cognitive strengths. 
Intellectual servility or obsequiousness is the interpersonal version of self-
abasement. The obsequious is the person who has lost all pride in his own abilities 
and does not demand to be granted the epistemic credit which is due to him. The 
individual who is servile is quick to accept the views of others, to take them to be 
his superiors, and to allow others to take credit for what are in fact his 
contributions. Individuals who are servile are also prone to self-abasement since 
both are coping strategies with humiliation. The person who is told time and again 
that he is stupid and no good may deal with the pain inflicted by this sort of 
treatment by thinking that it is warranted and adopt it in his attitudes toward his 
own abilities. The same person may also cope by learning to parrot the views of 
those who insult him in the hope of being accepted, at the same time he may in 
words and deeds demonstrate that he takes them to be his intellectual superiors. 
The relation of servility to self-abasement is analogous to that of haughtiness to 
arrogance. Thus, although servile people tend to self-abase, self-abasement can be 
the worse vice when one thinks that one is so low that one is not even able of 
slavish imitation. Hence, the person who is servile may retain a certain amount of 
self-respect by thinking that there are others lower than him. He may exhibit this 
belief by displaying vanity in his parroting. 
Also like in the case of haughtiness, judgements of social comparison play a 
central causal role in the formation of attitudes of the obsequious because they are 
included in their contents or informational bases. The individual who is servile 
compares himself negatively to others whom he considers as being superior. In 
particular, he compares himself to others who are reputed to possess an epistemic 
strength to test the hypothesis that he is dissimilar to these models, and to others 
who are not thought as particularly strong in some ability to test the hypothesis 
that he is similar to them. These comparisons are demoralising and lead to the 
formation of negative attitudes about one’s intellectual capacities. These attitudes 
serve a social-adjustive function if they assist the person’s ability to fit within the 
social group that attributes a low status to one. 
6. Changing Attitudes 
Recommendations for virtue education in the philosophical literature generally 
focus on four methodologies which have been characterised by Porter as the 
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standard approach.50 These are: (1) direct and formal instruction about the virtues; 
(2) exposure to exemplars leading to emulation of positive models; (3) practice of 
virtuous behaviours and (4) enculturation into virtue. The arguments developed in 
this paper for the identification of virtue and vices with attitudes suggest that at 
least some of these methodologies are likely not to be very effective when students 
have already formed non-virtuous attitudes. For reasons of space I shall consider 
only the first two methodologies here. Intuitively speaking, the shortcomings of 
these strategies are fairly obvious. Formal instruction may work only if those who 
are so instructed are willing to listen. Yet those students who are the furthest 
away from intellectual virtue are precisely those who are less likely to pay 
attention. Exposure to exemplars might work only if it stimulates emulation. It is 
counterproductive if it leads to demoralisation or if it fans an already inflated 
conception of the self. Sadly, those students who have developed non virtuous 
habits are most likely to react to models in precisely these ways. 
The effectiveness of a message on an audience does not exclusively depend 
on the strength of the arguments contained therein but also on the receptiveness 
of the audience. This much I think would be universally acknowledged. The 
extensive empirical literature on attitude change shows that the functions played 
by attitudes make a substantial difference to the effectiveness of messages 
encouraging one to change one’s mind. The most prominent accounts of attitude 
change are the elaboration likelihood model (ELM)51 and the heuristic systematic 
model (HSM).52 Both predict that unless an audience has the opportunity and the 
motivation to process the content of the message, it will rely on cues and other 
proxies to determine whether to be persuaded by it. In addition, ELM predicts that 
messages are subject to scrutiny for their argumentative content only if they are 
tailored to the function served in the audience by the attitude that they are 
designed to change. In other words, direct and well-argued instruction will be 
scrutinised only by those students whose attitudes already serve a knowledge 
function, whilst its persuasive power on other students is more likely to be 
determined by other considerations which function as cues such as the length of 
                                                                
50 Steven L. Porter, “A Therapeutic Approach to Intellectual Virtue Formation in the 
Classroom," In Intellectual Virtues and Education: Essays in Applied Virtue Epistemology, ed. 
Jason S. Baehr (New York and London: Routledge, 2016), 221-239. 
51 Richard E. Petty and John T. Cacioppo, “The Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion,” In 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, ed. Leonard Berkowitz (Orlando: Academic Press, 
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within and Beyond the Persuasion Context,” In Unintended Thought, eds. James S. Uleman and 
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the message or the attractiveness of its source. Despite its differences from ELM, 
HSM too predicts that a message recipient’s motivations are one of the most 
important factors that determine how it is received. In particular, unless the 
audience is already motivated to form accurate attitudes, the motives of ego 
defence or of social impression management will bias their responses to the 
arguments offered. In short it seems that only those students who already possess 
reasonably strong attitudes serving knowledge functions are in a position to 
respond to persuasive messages arguing for the value of adopting virtue by paying 
attention to, and critically assess, the content of the message. Other students may 
be more influenced by cues surrounding the message; the message may persuade 
them to some extent so that the affective or cognitive base of some of their 
attitude may change. However, it is unlikely to affect the function played by 
them. Yet this is crucial if the account of vice offered in this paper is correct. 
Direct instruction only works with students who are already somewhat virtuous. 
Exposure to exemplars suffers from a similar weakness since it inspires and 
encourages self-improvement only in those who already have fairly virtuous 
attitudes. There is a possibility that a student, who is exposed to a model and also 
told why the person in question is admirable, fails to accept the exemplar as an 
ideal. Instead, I assume here that the student honestly believes that the model is 
admirable and worthy of emulation. Nevertheless, it does not follow that the 
student is thereby motivated to emulate the exemplar. This point has already been 
noted by Zagzebski who observes that individuals might react with spiteful envy 
or with egoism, rather than with emulation, to the recognition that another 
person is admirable.53 The discussion of social comparison in section four above 
has highlighted another possible reaction: demoralisation leading to self-
abasement. 
Those students who possess a defensive high self-esteem and thus are 
predisposed toward haughtiness and arrogance are disposed to compare 
themselves for dissimilarity to others whom they believe are their inferiors. In 
addition, if they are encouraged to compare themselves to a person presented as an 
ideal to emulate, they respond to the encouragement by testing the hypothesis 
that they already possess some of the admirable features embodied by the 
exemplar. As a result, instead of encouraging self-improvement, when the 
haughty and the arrogant are made to compare themselves with admirable 
individuals, they will as result become even more deluded about their own actual 
self-worth. 
                                                                
53 See Linda Zagzebski, “I—Admiration and the Admirable," Aristotelian Society Supplementary 
Volume 89, 1 (2015): 205-221. 
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The promotion of admirable exemplars is equally damaging for students 
who suffer from self-abasing and obsequious tendencies. The encouragement to 
compare themselves to exemplars is likely to result in a strengthened belief that 
they do not possess the required qualities and that they never will. When a 
student thinks of himself as stupid or as not talented confrontation with those 
who exhibit intellectual qualities is bound to offer further evidence in favour of 
their own negative self-assessment. 
These considerations should not lead to pessimism about the possibility of 
educating students for intellectual virtue. In addition to the possible efficacy of 
both practice and enculturation, the considerations offered above suggest that 
educators should target students’ ego-defensive motives or social-adjustive 
tendencies to share socially prevalent low evaluations of members of a social 
group to which one belongs. There is increasing evidence that self-affirmation 
techniques have some success in building individual sense of self-esteem so as to 
reduce both defensiveness and low self-esteem.54 These strategies include 
emphasis on the fact that “intelligence is expandable” rather than fixed and the 
assignment of repeated self-reflective exercises where students are asked to 
explain what they value most and why.55 These exercises allow the students to 
think about those good things that define them. In this manner, they affirm their 
self-worth so that it is less in need of protection against threats. This technique 
thus would reduce the defensiveness of the arrogant and enhance the explicit self-
esteem of the self-abased.56  
By reducing the ego-defensive motive and by encouraging students to reject 
negative self-assessments based on societal expectations, self-affirmation changes 
the needs that guide students’ formations of attitudes. If this is right, it is a pre-
requisite for removing obstacles to the cultivation of the need for knowledge. 
Once students’ attitudes are guided by this need, it is more likely that both 
education and exposure to exemplars become effective in bringing about attitude 
                                                                
54 See Haddock and Gebauer, “Defensive Self-Esteem” for evidence that self-affirmation 
techniques are effective to reduce defensiveness in individuals who have high explicit self-
esteem but low implicit self-esteem and therefore tend to be very ego defensive. The efficacy of 
self-affirmation to boost performance in stereotype threat conditions can be seen as evidence for 
the effectiveness of this technique with people with low explicit and implicit self-esteem, see 
Claude Steele, Whistling Vivaldi and Other Clues to How Stereotypes Affect Us (New York and 
London: W. W. Norton, 2010), especially pp. 172-179. 
55 See Steele, Whistling Vivaldi especially ch. 9 for a presentation of the techniques and of their 
success in educational contexts. 
56 What I propose here is not dissimilar in spirit from Porter’s intellectual therapy, although the 
techniques endorsed are not the same. See Porter, “A Therapeutic Approach.” 
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change and in strengthening these attitudes so that they acquire the stability of 
virtue.57 
                                                                
57 I have presented some of the ideas included in this paper at an International Conference on 
Intellectual Humility held in Oxford in April 2015, at the Eidyn Workshop on Humility and 
Education (Edinburgh) in May 2015, at an international conference on the epistemic vices held 
in Durham in September 2015. My sincere thanks go to the organisers, co-presenters and 
audiences at all these events for their constructive comments and encouragement. Special 
thanks to J. Adam Carter for useful comments on the penultimate draft of this paper. 
